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Summary 17 
 Great apes have been shown to be intuitive statisticians: they can use proportional 18 
information within a population to make intuitive probability judgments about randomly drawn 19 
samples [1,2]. Humans, from early infancy onwards, functionally integrate intuitive statistics 20 
with other cognitive domains to judge the randomness of an event [3-7]. To date, nothing is 21 
known about such cross-domain integration in any nonhuman animal, leaving uncertainty 22 
about the origins of human statistical abilities. We investigated whether chimpanzees take into 23 
account information about psychological states of experimenters (their biases and visual 24 
access) when drawing statistical inferences. We tested 21 sanctuary-living chimpanzees in a 25 
previously established paradigm that required subjects to infer which of two mixed populations 26 
of preferred and non-preferred food items was more likely to lead to a desired outcome for the 27 
subject. In a series of three experiments we found that chimpanzees chose based on 28 
proportional information alone when they had no information about experimenters´ 29 
preferences and (to a lesser extent) when experimenters had biases for certain food types but 30 
drew blindly. By contrast, when biased experimenters had visual access, subjects ignored 31 
statistical information and instead chose based on experimenters´ biases. Lastly, chimpanzees 32 
intuitively used a violation of statistical likelihoods as indication for biased sampling. Our results 33 
suggest that chimpanzees have a random sampling assumption that can be overridden under 34 
the appropriate circumstances and they are able to use mental state information to judge 35 
whether this is necessary. This provides further evidence for a shared statistical inference 36 
mechanism in apes and humans.  37 
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Results  40 
 We used an established paradigm [1] in which chimpanzees faced two mixed 41 
populations of preferred and non-preferred food items and could choose from which of the two 42 
populations they wanted to receive a sample. In contrast to previous studies where drawing 43 
was always random, we here varied whether sampling was random or not (method adapted 44 
from [4]). To examine whether chimpanzees could integrate knowledge about others´ choice 45 
biases and visual access into their statistical inferences, we first demonstrated to them that two 46 
experimenters E1 and E2 had specific and opposing biases regarding two types of food in 47 
Experiment 1: E1 preferred the type of food liked less by the apes themselves (carrot), whereas 48 
E2 showed the same preferences as the apes (peanut). These choice biases were established as 49 
follows: E1 repeatedly drew only carrots from a population with mostly peanuts (200 peanuts 50 
and 20 carrot pieces) and E2 showed the reverse patterns, repeatedly drawing only peanuts 51 
from a population with mostly carrots (20 peanuts and 200 carrot pieces). During the 52 
subsequent two test conditions, subjects witnessed the two experimenters sampling from their 53 
respective populations and were allowed to pick one of the samples. As the sample itself was 54 
hidden inside E1’s/E2’s fist, they had to infer from which population/experimenter they would 55 
most likely receive a favorable food item as a sample. The crucial manipulation between 56 
conditions was whether the experimenters looked into the bucket during sampling (visual 57 
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access condition, see Figure 1A and B) or drew blindly (no visual access condition, see Figure 1C 58 
and D). The order of these two test conditions was counterbalanced across subjects.  59 
To examine chimpanzees´ baseline performance in this task without any prior information 60 
about experimenters´choice biases, we tested them in Experiment 2 with new food types in the 61 
same proportions as before (200:20 vs. 20:200). Similar to the no visual access test, both 62 
experimenters drew blindly from the populations. 63 
 We found that subjects´ choice in Experiment 1 was significantly influenced by 64 
conditions (GLMM; X2=44.26, df=1, P<0.001). More specifically, in the visual access condition, 65 
when experimenters looked into the buckets, chimpanzees preferentially picked the sample 66 
drawn from the less favorable population (Meanfavorable population=33.8.%), significantly different 67 
from what would be expected by chance (t=-3.58, df=19, P=0.002). Thus, subjects based their 68 
choice on the experimenters´ choice biases rather than on the proportional composition of the 69 
population. In contrast, when the same experimenters sampled blindly in the no visual access 70 
condition, subjects´ choice was different: Here they tended to choose the sample from the 71 
more favorable population more often, albeit not above what would be expected by chance 72 
(Meanfavorable population=57.1% of trials; t=1.37, df=19, P=0.187). Yet, a comparison of the two 73 
conditions revealed that subjects chose the proportionally favorable population significantly 74 
less often in the visual access condition than in the visual access condition (Estimate±SE=-75 
1.083±0.204, df=2, P<0.001, CI(-1.714,-0.496), see Figure 2). This pattern was not due to any 76 
order effects, since it held equally for both orders of presentation of the test conditions 77 
(X2=0.007, df=1, P=0.931). Moreover, the effect was not driven by single individuals: Apart from 78 
one young female showing the opposite pattern, and two subjects showing no difference 79 
B 
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between conditions, all remaining 17 individuals chose the sample from the more attractive 80 
population numerically more often in the no visual access condition.  81 
 In Experiment 2, when subjects did not have any prior information about potential 82 
choice biases and drawing was random, chimpanzees chose the sample from the more 83 
favorable population at the highest levels (Meanfavorable population=88.9% of trials), significantly 84 
above chance level (t=11.78, df=17, P<0.001) and significantly more often than in the visual 85 
access condition (Estimate±SE=3.261±0.355, df=2, P<0.001, CI(2.416,4.548)) and in the no 86 
visual access condition of Experiment 1 (Estimate±SE=2.177±0.352, df=2, P<0.001, 87 
CI(1.234,3.317; see Figure 2).  88 
 We did not find any effect of trial number within the conditions for the two 89 
experiments, indicating that chimpanzees did not learn within a session which of the two 90 
populations/experimenters was the rewarded one (X2=2.693, df=2, P=0.260). First trial 91 
performance confirmed the choice pattern: 45% of subjects chose the sample coming from the 92 
more attractive population in the first trial of the visual access condition compared to 60% in 93 
the no visual access condition and 78% in the random condition. The identity of the 94 
experimenter did not influence the chimpanzees’ choice (X2=1.130, df=1, P=0.264; see also 95 
Table S2 and S3 for detailed results of Experiment 1 and 2). 96 
To control for potential associative learning explanations, we lastly tested chimpanzees 97 
in Experiment 3, again using populations of new food types (100:10 vs. 10:100). Before the test, 98 
subjects experienced that both experimenters would always draw preferred food items out of 99 
their population. However, while E1 sampled blindly from the more favorable population, E2 100 
sampled from the less favorable one while looking into the bucket. In the subsequent test, both 101 
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experimenters drew in the same manner as before, but this time from identical populations 102 
containing equal proportions of preferred to non-preferred food items (55:55 vs. 55:55). We 103 
found that chimpanzees preferred the sample drawn by the experimenter who had before 104 
sampled the statistically unlikely (preferred) food type significantly above chance level 105 
(Meanfavorable experimenter=64.8% of trials; t=4.438, df=17, P<0.001; CI(0.577, 0.718); see Figure 3). 106 
Again, we did not find an effect of trial number (X2=0.007, df=1, P=0.933), indicating that 107 
subjects did not learn within the test session which experimenter was favorable (see also trial 1 108 
performance: 66.7%). Moreover, we did not find an effect of experimenter´s ID, neither when 109 
considering only Experiment 3 (X2=0.803, df=1, P=0.370), nor when considering whether it was 110 
the same or the opposite one compared to Experiment 1 (X2=1.142, df=1, P=0.286), indicating 111 
that subjects did not perform better when the positive experimenter was the same as in the 112 
first experiment (also see Table S4). 113 
Discussion 114 
 The current study shows that chimpanzees were able to flexibly adapt their choice as 115 
a function of statistical and psychological information in a paradigm that required them to 116 
reason probabilistically from population to sample. In the visual access condition of Experiment 117 
1, when biased experimenters drew samples while looking into the bucket, chimpanzees 118 
preferred the sample drawn by the experimenter with the preference for the favorable food 119 
type, mostly disregarding the proportional composition of the populations. This suggests that 120 
subjects expected the drawing to be based on the experimenters´ choice biases and therefore 121 
non-random in this condition. When the same biased experimenters drew samples from the 122 
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same populations in the no visual access condition blindly, subjects switched and now showed a 123 
slight preference for the proportion-wise more favorable population, despite the 124 
experimenters´ biases. Hence, depending on whether or not the experimenters had visual 125 
access to the buckets while drawing, subjects based their choice either on the experimenters´ 126 
choice biases or rather on the mere proportional composition of the population. In Experiment 127 
2, when chimpanzees did not have any information about potential biases of the experimenters 128 
and they drew blindly, subjects chose the sample drawn from the favorable population at 129 
higher levels than in both conditions of Experiment 1. Results of these two experiments suggest 130 
that chimpanzees, without any prior information, assumed random sampling and expected the 131 
sample to reflect the population´s distribution. If they, however, had reason to assume that the 132 
experimenters were biased, subjects´ choice reflected these biases; the severity of this 133 
influence was dependent on whether the experimenters had visual access or not.  134 
 However, despite the fact that we did not find any indication for learning within test 135 
sessions, we cannot exclude that subjects might have learned during the demonstration of 136 
Experiment 1 to simply associate one of the populations/experimenters positively or negatively, 137 
and pick/avoid this one in the visual access condition, where the setup was identical to the 138 
demonstration. The difference between conditions could congruently be explained by a change 139 
in setup in case of the no visual access condition (presence of a barrier) or the elapsed time in 140 
case of Experiment 2. We believe this scenario is unlikely considering that chimpanzees and 141 
other nonhuman primates are known to have severe difficulties learning rules that clash with 142 
their natural predisposition to choose the larger of two (preferred) food amounts [8-10]. 143 
Furthermore, the shortness of the demonstration exposure makes any rule-learning 144 
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explanation additionally implausible. Nevertheless, we sought to address this alternative 145 
explanation in Experiment 3, in which chimpanzees were required to infer an experimenter´s 146 
choice bias from statistical information (and according behavioral cues), without being 147 
differentially rewarded in the demonstration. In the test subjects intuitively preferred the 148 
sample drawn by the experimenter who had previously drawn the statistically unlikely (and 149 
preferred) food type in the demonstration over the experimenter who drew blindly (and 150 
therefore randomly). This suggests that chimpanzees were able to use statistical information, in 151 
particular a violation of statistical likelihoods, to infer an experimenter´s choice biases and draw 152 
conclusions about the sampling process. At the same time, it corroborates our hypothesis that 153 
subjects do not rely on associatively learned rules in this kind of task. It should be noted that, 154 
even though there is evidence that great apes have some understanding about human 155 
preferences or desires [11], we do not intend to make any strong claims about how 156 
chimpanzees interpreted the experimenter´s choice bias in our study. It is possible for example 157 
that the subjects inferred that Experimenter 1 seems to like (drawing/giving) peanuts. It is 158 
similarly possible that they simply noticed that Experimenter 1, for whatever reason, draws 159 
peanuts when she has the possibility to do so. We cannot disentangle these two possibilities 160 
and for the interpretation of our data it is sufficient to assume the latter option. 161 
 While chimpanzees showed a remarkable flexibility and sophistication in this study, 162 
one may wonder why they did not perform better in the no visual access condition of 163 
Experiment 1. Subjects in this condition chose the sample of the proportionally attractive 164 
population on average in 57% of trials as compared to 89% in Experiment 2, although we used 165 
the exact same proportions in both experiments. The most likely explanation for this difference 166 
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is that chimpanzees in Experiment 2 did not have any information about potential biases of the 167 
experimenters, which left the randomness of the draw the only aspect to consider (results of 168 
this experiment also demonstrated that subjects had not remembered any “good/bad”-labels 169 
for the experimenter from the previous experiment). By contrast, in the no visual access 170 
condition of Experiment 1, chimpanzees had to overcome what they had just experienced, 171 
namely, that E1 always extracted carrots from the peanut-population, and E2 always extracted 172 
peanuts from the carrot-population. This information was even repeated (in reminder trials) 173 
right before the no visual access condition. Hence, this condition required two extra steps 174 
compared to Experiment 2: Chimpanzees had to recognize and understand the indicators of 175 
blind drawing and they had to weigh the indicators of “biased sampling” and “blind sampling” 176 
against each other and choose accordingly. Therefore, our task design required a fair amount of 177 
cognitive flexibility which might have been too demanding for some of the subjects.  178 
 179 
Conclusions  180 
 Taken together the results of our three experiments suggest that chimpanzees did 181 
consider information about the experimenters´ choice biases and visual access when drawing 182 
statistical inferences. Subjects were not only able to recognize that sampling would be non-183 
random when biased experimenters had visual access while drawing, they also knew to some 184 
extent that when visual access was blocked, the choice bias information was rendered 185 
irrelevant and could therefore be dismissed. Moreover, chimpanzees were able to draw 186 
inferences about the experimenter and the sampling process from the given statistical 187 
information even without being differentially rewarded: when samples were unambiguously 188 
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non-representative of a populations´ distribution and the experimenter looked into the 189 
population while sampling, subjects seemed to infer that the sampling person must have a bias 190 
for drawing one of the food types and act accordingly in the test condition. While previous 191 
studies have shown that chimpanzees can reason probabilistically from population to sample 192 
[1, 2] and are sensitive to what others can and cannot see (both conspecifics [e.g. 12] and 193 
human experimenters [e.g. 13]), our study is the first to suggest that chimpanzees are able to 194 
flexibly combine these two sources of information to make rational decisions under 195 
uncertainty. Our results resemble findings on human infants: Just as the chimpanzees in our 196 
study, 11-month old infants were shown to be sensitive to whether a sample was drawn 197 
randomly from a population or not on the basis of information about the drawing agent’s 198 
psychological states (her preference and visual access) [4]. Similar to our apes, infants were also 199 
able use statistical information (in particular a violation of likelihoods), to draw conclusions 200 
about the sampling agent and the sampling process [14, 15].   201 
Our study therefore gives further reason to assume that human statistical reasoning might be 202 
grounded in a cognitive mechanism that is utilized from early infancy onwards and shared with 203 
our closest living relatives.  204 
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Main text figure legends 279 
Figure 1  280 
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Illustration of the procedures of the two test conditions in Experiment 1. In the visual 281 
access condition, experimenters looked into the buckets while sampling (A) before offering the 282 
subject a choice between the two samples hidden in their fists (B). In the no visual access 283 
condition (C and D), a screen was placed between experimenters and buckets, blocking the 284 
experimenters´ view into the populations. Moreover, in this condition the experimenters´ faces 285 
and bodies were oriented away from the table, further emphasizing a lack of visual access to 286 
the buckets during sampling. 287 
Figure 2  288 
Proportion of trials in which subjects chose the sample drawn from the more 289 
favorable population in Experiment 1 and 2. Size of the dots represents number of subjects 290 
performing at the same level. Bold horizontal lines depict the mean probability predicted by the 291 
model and grey dotted vertical lines depict bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. Also see 292 
Table S2 and S3. 293 
Figure 3  294 
Proportion of trials in which subjects chose the sample drawn by the experimenter 295 
with a bias for the preferred food type (instead of the sample drawn by the blind 296 
experimenter) in Experiment 3. Size of the dots represents number of subjects performing at 297 
the same level. Bold horizontal line depicts the mean value for all subjects and grey dotted 298 
vertical lines depict 95% confidence intervals. Dashed horizontal line indicates chance level (i.e. 299 
indifference between both experimenters). See also Table S4. 300 
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STAR Methods 301 
Contact for Reagent and Resource Sharing 302 
Further information and requests for resources and reagents should be directed to and 303 
will be fulfilled by the Lead Contact, Johanna Eckert (eckert.johanna@gmail.com). 304 
Experimental Model and Subject Details 305 
In total, we tested 21 chimpanzees (9 females) with estimated ages between 7 and 33 306 
years (Mean=18.7). Twenty of those participated in Experiment 1, 18 participated in Experiment 307 
2 and 3 (see Table S1 for more detailed information about the subjects). All individuals were 308 
wild born orphans that lived in a social group of 49 individuals at Ngamba Island Chimpanzee 309 
Sanctuary, Uganda. In accordance with the recommendations of the Weatherall report ‘The use 310 
of nonhuman primates in research’ chimpanzees were allowed to roam freely on the 40 ha 311 
island covered with tropical rainforest during the day and voluntarily spend the night in seven 312 
interconnected sleeping rooms (approx. 140 m2) with regular feedings and water ad libitum. 313 
Subjects participated in the study on voluntary basis and were never food or water deprived. 314 
Research strictly adhered to the legal requirements of Uganda and was reviewed and approved 315 
by the Ugandan Wildlife Authorities and the Ugandan National Council for Science and 316 
Technology. The study was ethically approved by committees of the Max Planck Institute for 317 
Evolutionary Anthropology and the Chimpanzee Sanctuary & Wildlife Conservation Trust. 318 
Animal husbandry and research comply with the ‘PASA Primate Veterinary Healthcare Manual’ 319 
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and the ‘Guidelines for the Treatment of Animals in Behavioral Research and Teaching’ of the 320 
Association for the Study of Animal Behavior.  321 
Method Details 322 
The study consisted of three experiments. Experiment 1 was conducted in May 2017, 323 
Experiment 2 and 3 were conducted consecutively in January 2018. In all Experiments, subjects 324 
were tested individually in their sleeping rooms and two experimenters E1 and E2 were seated 325 
at a table (L/W/H: 73cm/40cm/48cm) in front of the subject close to the mesh. As stimuli we 326 
used mixed populations of preferred and non-preferred food items that were presented in two 327 
transparent buckets ( 21.5 cm; height 19 cm). Food items of both types were of roughly equal 328 
size. 329 
Experiment 1 330 
Experiment 1 consisted of three phases: the demonstration phase, the visual access 331 
condition and the no visual access condition. In all phases, E1 presented a transparent bucket 332 
filled with 200 peanuts and 20 carrot pieces (P1), E2 presented a bucket filled with 20 peanuts 333 
and 200 carrot pieces (P2). We knew from previous studies (e.g. Eckert et al., under revision) 334 
that all tested individuals clearly preferred peanuts over carrots; hence, P1 was considered the 335 
more attractive population. The identity of E1 and E2 was counterbalanced across subjects. 336 
While all individuals started with the demonstration phase, the order of presentation of the 337 
two test phases was counterbalanced to avoid potential order effects. All three phases were 338 
tested on consecutive days. Twenty subjects participated in this experiment. 339 
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Demonstration phase 340 
In the demonstration phase subjects experienced that both experimenters had a bias to 341 
sample items of the minority type in their bucket, i.e. E1 for carrot pieces (from population P1) 342 
and E2 for peanuts (from population P2). In other words, E2 had the same preference as the 343 
subject, while E1 had the opposing preference. A demonstration trial started with the right 344 
experimenter presenting her bucket by shaking it, tilting it and turning it around to give the 345 
subject a good overview about the content. Subsequently, she looked into her bucket, searched 346 
for three seconds using one hand and then visibly drew one item (of the minority type) and 347 
handed it to the subject. In the next trial, the left experimenter did the same with her bucket. In 348 
one session, subjects received ten demonstration trials per experimenter, with both 349 
experimenters sampling in alternating order. The side on which the experimenters were seated 350 
was counterbalanced. Chimpanzees received a total of two demonstration sessions on two 351 
consecutive days. 352 
Test phase 353 
Each test condition (visual access condition and no visual access condition) was 354 
administered in a single session consisting of 12 trials. The order of presentation of the two 355 
conditions was counterbalanced. Before a test session, each subject received three reminder 356 
trials per experimenter using the same procedure as in the demonstration trials. 357 
Visual access condition 358 
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Each trial started with the right experimenter presenting her population by shaking, 359 
tilting and turning the bucket. Then the left experimenter did the same with her bucket. 360 
Subsequently, E1 and E2 simultaneously looked into their bucket, searched for three seconds 361 
using one hand and drew one item each without the subject seeing which item they had 362 
extracted (see Figure 1A). Just as in the demonstration, both experimenters always sampled an 363 
item of the minority type, i.e. E1 drew a less favorable item (carrot) out of the more favorable 364 
population (mostly peanuts), E2 drew a more favorable item (peanut) out of the less favorable 365 
population (mostly carrots). Both experimenters kept the sample hidden in their fist and 366 
presented the closed fist to the subject (see Figure 1B). The subject then indicated a choice 367 
between the two samples by pointing to one of the fists and immediately received the chosen 368 
sample as reward. Again, the side on which E1 sat was counterbalanced.  369 
No visual access condition 370 
The procedure was the same as for the visual access condition with the following 371 
modification: After having presented their buckets with the populations, the experimenters 372 
placed an opaque screen (L/W/H: 60cm/15cm/37cm) in between themselves and the buckets 373 
thereby blocking their view into the buckets. To further emphasize their lack of visual access, 374 
experimenters´ body orientation and gaze was directed away from the buckets during the 375 
sampling process (see Figure 1C). Next, both experimenters drew quickly and randomly the first 376 
item they could grasp in the bucket. Subsequently, the subject was offered a choice between 377 
the two hidden samples (Figure 1D).  378 
Experiment 2 379 
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In Experiment 2, subjects were tested in a single test condition and did not experience 380 
any demonstration beforehand (and accordingly no reminder-trials). In order to avoid carry-381 
over effects from Experiment 1, we used new types of food, their preference hierarchy was 382 
established in preference tests before and after the experiment (see Table S1 for more detailed 383 
information). The proportions within the populations remained the same as before (200:20 vs. 384 
20:200). The procedure was similar to the no visual access condition of Experiment 2 with the 385 
following two modifications: 1. Experimenters were not assigned to one of the buckets across 386 
trials; instead, we counterbalanced the number of trials in which each experimenter presented 387 
and sampled from each of the populations. Thereby we hoped to minimize chances that 388 
subjects would form good/bad associations with the experimenters (while we were at the same 389 
time able to detect such potential effects statistically post hoc). 2. We did not use the barrier to 390 
indicate blind drawing; instead, the experimenters just turned away from the buckets and 391 
directed their gaze towards the ceiling. In doing so we wanted to examine whether these cues 392 
are sufficient for the apes to assume random drawing, which was important for the subsequent 393 
Experiment 3. Two subjects changed preferences over the course of the experiment (showing 394 
the opposite preference in the food preference test after the experiment compared to before). 395 
Accordingly, their data was excluded from the analysis. One further subject that had 396 
participated in Experiment 1 did not show any preference for one of the food types and was 397 
therefore not tested. In total, we included 18 subjects in the analysis. 398 
Experiment 3  399 
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Experiment 3 consisted of two phases, the demonstration phase and the test phase, 400 
which were administered on consecutive days (only one subject did not enter the sleeping 401 
room the day after the demonstration phase and therefore had a one-day-break between 402 
demonstration and test). We again used new types of food in order to avoid carry over effects 403 
from the previous experiments (see Table S1). One individual had to be excluded because of 404 
lack of motivation; two further subjects could not be tested because they either did not enter 405 
the sleeping rooms within our data collection period or because they did not show a clear 406 
preference for one of the food types. In total, we included 18 subjects in our data analysis. 407 
Demonstration phase 408 
In the demonstration phase subjects experienced that E1 would blindly draw preferred 409 
items from the more favorable population (P1: 100 preferred and 10 non-preferred items), 410 
while E2 would intentionally draw preferred food items from the less favorable population (P2: 411 
10 preferred and 100 non-preferred items). In each trial, consecutively, E1 turned away, 412 
directed her gaze towards the ceiling and drew one item quickly from her population and 413 
handed it over to the subject; E2 looked into her bucket and searched for three seconds before 414 
she handed over a preferred food item to the subject. Both experimenters always drew the 415 
preferred food type (except for one trial each for two subjects in which E2 accidentally drew a 416 
non-preferred item. Note that we ran a second analysis without these two subjects which did 417 
not change the significance of the results). Per session, subjects saw ten demonstration trials 418 
per experimenter, with both experimenters sampling in alternating order. For half of the 419 
subjects the identity of E1 and E2 remained the same as in Experiment 1, for the other half 420 
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identities were swopped, which allowed us to test for carry over effects in our analysis. The side 421 
on which experimenters were seated was counterbalanced and the experimenter on the right 422 
always started sampling. Chimpanzees received a total of two demonstration sessions on two 423 
consecutive days. 424 
Test phase 425 
Before a test session, each subject received three reminder trials per experimenter using 426 
the same procedure as in the demonstration trials. In the test trials both experimenters had the 427 
exact same population with the same proportion of preferred to non-preferred food items 428 
(55:55). Hence, both populations depicted a 50% chance of leading to a preferred food item as 429 
randomly drawn sample. Each trial started with the right experimenter presenting her 430 
population by shaking, tilting and turning the bucket. Then the left experimenter did the same 431 
with her bucket. Subsequently, E2 looked into her bucket and searched for three seconds, while 432 
E1 turned away, directed her gaze towards the ceiling and moved her arm over the bucket. 433 
Then, both experimenters simultaneously drew one item without the subject seeing which item 434 
they had extracted. Both experimenters kept the sample hidden in their fist and presented the 435 
closed fist to the subject. The subject then indicated a choice between the two samples by 436 
pointing to one of the fists. Here, E2 always sampled preferred items, while E1 drew truly 437 
randomly. Again, the side on which E1 sat was counterbalanced. Chimpanzees received a total 438 
of 12 test trials presented in a single session. 439 
Quantification and Statistical Analysis 440 
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The apes´ choice was coded live. A second blind observer coded 20% of the trials from 441 
video for each experiment. Both raters were in excellent agreement (Experiment 1: K=.96, 442 
N=97; Experiment 2: K=1, N=48; Experiment 3: K=.94, N=48). To analyze Experiment 1 and 2, we 443 
ran a Generalized Linear Mixed Model (GLMM) [16] with subject’s choice (between 444 
populations) as dependent variable. As fixed effects we included condition, order of conditions, 445 
experimenter ID and trial number (to check for potential learning effects) as well as the three-446 
way-interaction between condition, order and trial number. To control for a potential (linear or 447 
non-linear) effect of subjects’ age, we included age and age2 as further fixed effects. Subject ID 448 
was included as random effect. To keep type I error rate at the nominal level of 5% [17,18] we 449 
included all possible random slopes components (condition, trial number and experimenter ID 450 
within subject ID) and the respective correlations between random slopes and intercepts. Trial 451 
number, age and age2 were z-transformed (to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). 452 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) [19] were derived for a standard linear model excluding the 453 
random effects and interactions, using the function vif of the R-package car [20] and did not 454 
indicate collinearity to be an issue. We assessed model stability by comparing the estimates 455 
derived by a model based on all data with those obtained from models with the levels of the 456 
random effects excluded one at a time. This revealed the model was stable. The significance of 457 
the full model as compared to the null model (comprising only age, age2 and the random effect 458 
subject ID) was established using a likelihood ratio test (R function Anova with argument test 459 
set to “Chisq”) [21,22]. P-values for the individual effects were based on likelihood ratio tests 460 
comparing the full with respective reduced models (R function drop1). The model was fitted in 461 
R [23] using the function lmer of the R-package lme4 [24]. To assess whether the average 462 
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performance of subjects in the different conditions was different from what would be expected 463 
by chance, we used two-tailed one-sample t-tests, which were also administered in R. 464 
To analyze Experiment 3 we ran a second GLMM with subject’s choice (between 465 
experimenters) as dependent variable. As fixed effects we included trial number (to check for 466 
potential learning effects) and experimenter ID in Experiment 1 and 3, as well as the interaction 467 
between experimenter ID in both experiments (to check whether, e.g. individuals who had the 468 
same person as “positive experimenter” in both experiments performed better than those who 469 
had the opposite person). To control for a potential (linear or non-linear) effect of subjects’ age, 470 
we included age and age2 as further fixed effects. Subject ID was included as random effect. 471 
Again, we included all possible random slopes components (trial number within subject ID) and 472 
the respective correlations between random slopes and intercepts. Trial number, age and age2 473 
were z-transformed (to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one). Again, Variance 474 
Inflation Factors (VIF) did not indicate collinearity to be an issue and model the model was 475 
found to be stable. The significance of the full model as compared to the null model (comprising 476 
only age, age2 and the random effect subject ID) was again tested using a likelihood ratio test. 477 
P-values for the individual effects were based on likelihood ratio tests comparing the full with 478 
respective reduced models (R function drop1). Again, the model was fitted in R using the 479 
function lmer of the R-package lme4 and to assess whether the average performance of 480 
subjects was different from what would be expected by chance, we used a two-tailed one-481 
sample t-test. 482 
Data and Software Availability 483 
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 Analysis-specific code and data are available by request to the Lead Contact. 484 
